We study the online version of the scheduling problem involving selfish agents considered by Archer and Tardos [FOCS 2001]: jobs must be scheduled on m parallel related machines, each of them owned by a different selfish agent.
Introduction
Optimization problems dealing with resource allocation are classical algorithmic problems and they have been studied for decades in several models. Typically, algorithms are evaluated by We want to assign every job to a machine so to minimize the makespan, that is, the maximum over all machines of w i /s i , where w i is the sum of the job weights assigned to machine i. When the set of machines m is fixed, this problem version is commonly denoted to as Q m ||C max .
We study the selfish version of the Q||C max problem in which each machine i is owned by a selfish agent and the corresponding speed s i is known to that agent only. In particular, any schedule S that assigns load w i to machine i is valuated by agent i as v i (S), where
that is, the opposite of the completion time of machine i. Intuitively, v i (S) represents how much user i likes solution S. This model has been first considered by Archer and Tardos [AT01] .
We stress that our goal is to compute a solution S which minimizes the makespan with respect to the true machine speeds s 1 , . . . , s m . Hence, we need to provide some incentive (e.g., a payment P i ) to the each agent i in order to let him/her truthfully report his/her speed. Formally, a mechanism is a pair M = (A, P A ), where P A = (P . If M guarantees that the utility is non-negative for all agents i that report their true type, then we say that the mechanism enjoys the voluntary participation property.
Online Selfish Version. In the online version of Q||C max , jobs arrive one-by-one and must be scheduled upon their arrival. Moreover, jobs cannot be reallocated. For any (possibly infinite) sequence of jobs J = J 1 J 2 · · ·, we let J k denote the prefix J 1 J 2 · · · J k of the first k jobs, for 1 ≤ k ≤ |J|. Before any job appears, each agent declares her type and we denote by b = (b 1 , . . . , b m ) the vector of declared types. An online mechanism for Q||C max is a pair M = (A, P ) where P is a sequence of payment functions P k i , for i = 1, . . . , m and k > 0 such that • The algorithm A is an online algorithm for Q||C max ; we denote by w A i (b, J k ) the sum of the job sizes assigned to machine i by the solution computed by A on input J k and vector b of declared types.
• When the k-th jobs arrives, it is assigned by A to a machine and each agent i receives non-
That is, we are not allowed to ask money back from the agents.
The total payment received by agent i after k jobs is
Definition 1 (online truthful mechanism) We say that an online mechanism is truthful with respect to dominant strategies if for any prefix J k of J, for all b −i , and for all types t i , the function u
Verifiable Machines. We also study the online version of the model proposed by Nisan and Ronen [NR99] of verifiable machines. Here the payment for each job is awarded after the job is released by the machine (we stress that a machine cannot release a job assigned to it before the job has been executed). Intuitively, if a machine has received positive load, the mechanism can verify whether the machine lied declaring to be faster and, if so, the machine receives no payment.
Previous results
Archer and Tardos [AT01] have characterized the (offline) algorithms A for Q||C max for which there exist payment functions P such that (A, P ) is a truthful mechanism. In particular they show that if an algorithm A is monotone (that is, it satisfies w
there exists a payment function P such that (A, P ) is truthful. Under mild assumptions on A, it is possible to define the payment function to guarantee voluntary participation. They also gave a monotone optimal (exponential-time) algorithm for Q||C max and a (3 + ε)-approximate randomized (polynomial-time) monotone algorithm. In [ADPP04a] we gave a (4 + ε)-approximate deterministic (polynomial-time) monotone algorithm for Q m ||C max . Recently and independently from this work, Andelman et al [AAS] provided an elegant technique for turning any ρ-approximation algorithm for Q m ||C max into a ρ(1 + ε)-approximation monotone mechanism. As a result, given any polynomial-time (1 + ε)-approximation algorithm for this problem, one can obtain a (1 + ε)-approximation mechanism running in polynomial time. They indeed settle the approximation guarantee of the Q m ||C max by obtaining a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme which is monotone. Moreover, they provide a 5-approximation truthful mechanism for the Q||C max problem, i.e., for any number of machines.
Nisan and Ronen [NR99] considered the case of unrelated machines and gave a randomized 7/4-approximate truthful mechanism for two machines and a deterministic m-approximate truthful mechanism for any number of machines. Moreover, they proved that no deterministic truthful mechanism can be (2 − ε)-approximate for m ≥ 2 machines. Nisan and Ronen also considered the case of verifiable unrelated machines and gave a polynomial-time (1 + ε)-approximate truthful mechanism for any fixed number of machines. For the case of verifiable related machines (that is Q||C max ), in [ADPP04b] , we characterized the algorithms A for which there exist payment functions P such that (A, P ) is a truthful mechanism. Based on this we developed a polynomialtime (1 + ε)-approximate truthful mechanism for the offline version of Q||C max .
Our contribution
A central question in (algorithmic) mechanism design is to translate approximation/online algorithms into approximation/online mechanisms: given an algorithm A of approximation/competitive ratio ρ, can we obtain a monotone algorithm A with the same approximation/competitive ratio? A general approach to the design of approximation/competitive mechanisms might be that of developing general "monotonization" techniques: starting from any ρ-approximation/competitive algorithm A, transform A into a monotone algorithm A with approximation/competitive ratio ρ depending on ρ. We first consider the Q 2 ||C max problem for which we provide the following two general results:
Offline Case: Every polynomial-time ρ-approximation algorithm can be transformed into a monotone polynomial-time (ρ + ε)-approximation algorithm A, for every ε > 0 (Theorem 10). Algorithm A essentially uses A as a black-box as it simply enforces the 'monotonicity requirement' by inspecting the solutions output by A. In particular, only a polynomial number of such solutions are needed and thus A runs in polynomial time if A does. This result is a special case of the one obtained independently by Andelman et al [AAS] : indeed, their monotonization technique extends our result to any fixed number of machines.
Online Case: Given an online ρ-competitive algorithm A, for every t > 0, it is possible to obtain an online monotone algorithm A t whose competitive ratio ρ satisfies ρ ≤ min{ρ · t, 1 + 1/t} (Theorem 14). Moreover, the same bound holds if A is a ρ-competitive algorithm (only) for identical speeds. The "monotonization" of the greedy algorithm 1 thus yields and online mechanism whose competitive ratio is at most 1 + √ 7/2 < 1.823 (Corollary 15).
It is natural to ask whether the loss of performance due to our "monotonization" for the online setting is really necessary, and whether (some of the) existing algorithms could preserve their competitive guarantee (after being turned into a monotone one).
We first show a general lower bound on monotone online algorithms. Consider the problem restricted to instances for which s max /s min = r, for any r > 0. Then, no such algorithm can be less than ρ(r)-competitive, with ρ(r) ≥ min{r, 1 + 1/r} (Theorem 16). This gives a general lower bound of φ ≃ 1.62, which also holds for sequences of two jobs (Corollary 17). At least for such sequences our technique is optimal: indeed, since the greedy algorithm is 1-competitive, our method yields a φ-competitive online algorithm (simply choose t = φ).
Concerning the issue of designing new online monotone algorithms and/or adapting existing ones, we observe that there is a common idea in the design of approximation/online algorithms and in the Vickrey auction (see e.g. [NR99] ): speed vectors s = (s 1 , s 2 ) and s α = (αs 2 , αs 1 ) lead to the same solution (modulo a machine re-indexing). We show that this (apparently natural) way of proceeding must necessarily lead to online monotone algorithms whose competitive ratio is not smaller than 2. In particular, we isolate two pathological facts that, each of them alone, prevent from having a non-trivial competitive ratio (see Theorems 20-21):
• The first job is always assigned to the fastest machine; • Solution for (s 1 , s 2 ) is isomorphic (modulo a index exchange) to that for (s 2 , s 1 ).
Offline Online
It is worth observing that the lack of information plays a central role both in the online and in the selfish setting of the problem. In the online setting we do not know the "future;" when dealing with "selfish" agents we do not know part of the input. Our results (see Table 1 ) show that the combination "online+selfish" makes the Q 2 ||C max problem harder than both the offline with selfish agents and the online (without selfish agents) versions. In particular, for √ 2 < r ≤ φ, it holds that (i) r is a lower bound for any online monotone algorithm (i.e., any mechanism), while (ii) there is an upper bound ρ ≤ 1 + 1/(r + 1) < r provided by the greedy for the online case (without selfish agents).
All our lower bounds also apply to Q m ||C max , for any m > 2. As for the upper bounds, in Sect. 6 we present a 12-competitive algorithm for any number of verifiable machines. This is the first constant-competitive truthful online algorithm for any number of machines (Q||C max ).
The ability to "verify" machines has been proved to yield better approximation mechanisms in the offline case for other scheduling problems [NR99, ADPP04b] . The results here show that the same happens also for the online version of Q m ||C max , for any m ≥ 2. By contrast, the results by Andelman et al [AAS] imply that in the offline setting verification does not help for Q m ||C max , for any m ≥ 2.
Notation. Throughout the paper s i will denote the speed of the i-th machine, t i its type (i.e., t i = 1/s i ) and b i the type reported by agent i.
Characterization of Online Truthful Mechanisms
For the offline case, Archer and Tardos [AT01] characterized the class of algorithms that can be used as part of a truthful mechanism. More precisely, we have the following definition and theorem. 
is the load assigned to machine i when J is the job sequence and agents report types (b i , b −i ).
Theorem 3 (offline characterization [AT01]) A mechanism M = (A, P ) is truthful if and only if A is monotone. Moreover, for every monotone algorithm A, there exist payment functions P such that (A, P ) is truthful and satisfies voluntary participation if and only if
∞ for all i, J, and b −i . In this case, we can take the payments to be
(
Next, we translate the result above into the online setting. We will use the characterization to obtain our upper and lower bounds.
Theorem 4 (online characterization) An online mechanism M = (A, P ) is truthful if and only if
A is an online monotone algorithm. Moreover, for every online monotone algorithm A, there exists a payment function P such that (A, P ) is truthful. In addition, there exist payment functions
PROOF SKETCH. We only prove the last part of the theorem. The remaining of the proof can be obtained from proof of Theorem 3 in [AT01] .
Observe that, since we do not allow to reassign jobs, it holds that, for every b i ,
Thus, by Eq.
(1) we have that
2 3 Monotonization Techniques
Offline Monotonization
In this section we give a general technique for transforming any ρ-approximate algorithm A for Q 2 ||C max into an offline (ρ + ε)-approximate monotone algorithm A. Essentially, our monotonization technique goes thorough two steps: (i) we first consider an algorithm A γ which is noting but A running over speeds rounded to the closest power of γ, and (ii) we inspect the solutions of A γ by varying only one of the two machine speeds over a polynomial number of values: indeed, considering only instances (1, γ i ) will guarantee the monotonicity. In the sequel we let A be any algorithm satisfying the following two properties:
This is without loss of generality since any offline algorithm which violates any of the two conditions above can be easily modified without any loss in the approximation guarantee.
Definition 5
For every γ > 0 we define algorithm A γ as follows. For every x ≥ 1, x ∈ R, we let
The next lemma reduces the problem of proving the monotonicity of A γ to a simpler case in which s 1 = 1 and s 2 = γ i , i = 1, 2, . . .
Lemma 6 For every
We have two cases:
We distinguish two subcases:
(i + k ≤ j.) Eq. (4) and the fact that A is symmetric imply
Hence
thus contradicting Eq. (5).
Algorithm 
2
Based on the previous lemma, our main idea is to modify A γ so to guarantee that
Our idea is to systematically modify the solutions of A γ so that the resulting algorithm A satisfies w
The algorithm A is shown in Fig. 1 .
Theorem 7 Algorithm A is monotone.
PROOF. For any (s 1 , s 2 ), algorithm A rounds the machine speeds tos 1 = γ i 1 ands 2 = γ i 2 , exactly as A γ does. Then, it assigns to the fastest machine a total work of max 1≤l≤i W A γ (l, J), where i = i 2 − i 1 . In particular, we have that w
. In order to apply Lemma 6, we play the following trick: consider A as a new algorithm and apply Definition 5 to it, thus obtaining algorithm A ′′ def = (A) γ . Clearly, A ′′ and A produce the same
We next argue about the approximation ratio of A. Towards this end, in the sequel, given an assignment for jobs in J, we let w X i denote the work assigned to machine i according to X, i = 1, 2. We first prove the following result:
Lemma 8 Let X and X ′ be two assignments for jobs in J such that the following three conditions hold:
1. X is a c-approximation for the instance ((s 1 , s 2 ) , J), with s 1 ≤ s 2 ; 2. X ′ is a c-approximation for the instance ((s 1 , s
Eq.s (6)- (7) imply cost(X,
Lemma 9 If A γ is a c-approximation algorithm, then A is a c-approximation algorithm as well.
PROOF. Let us first consider the case s 1 ≤ s 2 . By definition, A((s 1 , s 2 ), J) = A((1, γ lmax ), J). We have two cases:
is a c-approximate solution for speeds (s 1 , s lmax ) (respectively, for speeds (1, γ i )). Since l max < i ands 2 = γ i 2 = γ i+i 1 , we have that s lmax ≤ s 2 . Hence, Lemma 8 implies that X is also a c-approximate solution for the instance ((s 1 , s 2 ), J).
The case s 1 > s 2 can be proved in the same way by exchanging the two machine indexes.
2
Putting things together we obtain the following:
Theorem 10 For every ε > 0, there exists γ > 1 such that, if A is a (polynomial-time) ρ-approximation algorithm for Q 2 ||C max , then algorithm A is a monotone (polynomial-time) (ρ + ε)-approximation algorithm.
Corollary 11
For every ε > 0, there exists a polynomial-time (1 + ε)-approximation mechanism for Q 2 ||C max . 
Remark 12 Recently and independently from this work, the above result has been improved in [AAS]. The authors provided a more general technique for obtaining a monotone algorithm

Online Monotonization
In this section, we give a general technique for transforming an online algorithm for Q 2 ||C max into an online monotone algorithm for Q 2 ||C max . Based on this transformation, we present an online monotone algorithm whose competitive ratio is about 1.823.
The basic idea is to output a "fixed" allocation that ignores the machine speeds as long as they are "almost the same": this allocation is based on the machine indexes only. As soon as one machine becomes significantly faster than the other, we assign all jobs to that machine. The algorithm template in Figure 2 implements this idea.
Theorem 13
For every t > 1 and for every online algorithm A for Q 2 ||C max , algorithm Aasymmetric is an online monotone algorithm for Q 2 ||C max .
PROOF. The algorithm A-asymmetric is clearly an online algorithm since the choice of which strategy to use is done based on the machine speeds, which do not change during the online phase (i.e., when jobs arrive).
Let w
A−as i
((s 1 , s 2 ), J) denote the work assigned to machine i by A-asymmetric on input J and speeds (s 1 , s 2 ), for i = 1, 2. Also let W (J) = |J| a=1 J a . Observe that, by definition of A-asymmetric, we have that 
Notice that, since t > 1, we have s 2 /t < s 2 . From the above equation we obtain the allocation curve in Figure 3 , which clearly implies the monotonicity w.r.t. machine 1. By using the same argument, we can prove the monotonicity of the function w A−as 2 ((s 1 , ·), J). This completes the proof.
Theorem 14
For every ρ-competitive online algorithm A for Q 2 ||C max , and for every t > 1, algorithm A-asymmetric is ρ as -competitive algorithm for Q 2 ||C max for ρ as = max{ρ · t, 1 + 1/t}.
PROOF. We first observe that assigning all jobs to the fastest machine yields a solution of cost at most 1 + 1/r times the optimum. Therefore, if r > t, algorithm A-asymmetric is (1 + 1/t)-competitive. Otherwise, that is r ≤ t, algorithm A-asymmetric runs algorithm A which computes a solution whose makespan is at most ρ times the optimum for identical speeds. We next show that the solution A ((1, 1) , J), on speeds (1, s), has cost bounded from above by ρ·r·opt ((1, s) A((1, 1) , J), from the above inequality and using the fact that A is ρ-competitive, we obtain
Using a simple rescaling argument, we have that
This and Eq. (9) imply that A-asymmetric is at most (ρ · r)-competitive. If r ≤ t, then the theorem follows. Otherwise, that is r > t, we have that A-asymmetric does not use algorithm A, thus it has a competitive ratio of 1 + 1/r < 1 + 1/t. This completes the proof. 2
Corollary 15
There exists an online monotone algorithm for Q 2 ||C max whose competitive ratio is
PROOF. Let us consider the greedy algorithm A gr whose competitive ratio on two machines of identical speed is 3/2 [Gra66] . Then, from Theorem 14 we have that algorithm A gr -asymmetric has competitive-ratio bounded from above by max{3t/2, 1 + 1/t}. We minimize this quantity by choosing t > 1 such that 3t/2 = 1+1/t. This corresponds to t =
, thus yielding a competitive ratio equal to
Lower Bound for Online Selfish Scheduling
In this section, we provide a general lower bound for online Q||C max with selfish agents. This result proves that the selfish online version of this problem is more difficult than the corresponding version of the problem with no selfish agents, even for two machines.
Theorem 16
For every m ≥ 2 and every r > 1, no monotone online algorithm can be less than ρ r -competitive, where ρ r = min{r, 1 + 1/r}. This holds even for two jobs.
PROOF. By contradiction, let A be an online monotone ρ-competitive algorithm on m machines, for ρ < min{r, 1 + 1/r}. Let J = (J 1 , J 2 ) = (1, r) and let s = (1, . . . , 1). Observe that A(s, J) cannot allocate two jobs on the same machine otherwise A would produce a solution of cost 1 + r, while the optimum costs r, contradicting the hypothesis that A is ρ competitive. Without loss of generality, assume w A 1 = 1 and w A 2 = r. Suppose now that speed of machine 1 is increased to r. Since A is monotone also with respect to the sequence J 1 , then it must be the case that w
Since we do not allow jobs to be reassigned, we have to consider only two cases: Hence the theorem follows. 2
Corollary 17
No monotone online algorithm for Q 2 ||C max can be less than φ-competitive. This holds even for two jobs, in which case the bound is tight since there exists a φ-competitive online monotone algorithm.
PROOF. The lower bound follows from Theorem 16 by taking r = φ = 1 + 1/r. As for the upper bound, consider algorithm A gr -asymmetric with t = φ. For sequences of two jobs A gr is 1-competitive. Theorem 14 thus implies a competitive ratio ρ ≤ max{φ, 1 + 1/φ} = φ. 2
On Building Online Monotone Algorithms
In this section we show that a large class of "natural" algorithms, including most of the known algorithms for scheduling, cannot achieve a competitive ratio smaller than 2. This lower bound implies that, for m = 2, these algorithms cannot improve over the trivial 2-approximation monotone algorithm that assigns all the jobs to the machine that declares to be faster. Apparently, a good way to obtain online monotone algorithms is to guarantee that faster machines receive more work. In particular, when dealing with the case of only one job, a natural (optimal) solution is to assign it to the fastest machine. This is also what Vickery auction would give for our problem. (These so called "sealed bid" auctions compute a solution only based on the agents' bids.) This motivates the following definition:
Definition 18 (best-first algorithm) An algorithm A is best-first if the first job is always assigned to the fastest machine.
In addition, it is natural to treat speeds (s 1 , s 2 ) and (αs 2 , αs 1 ) as essentially the same instance: by rescaling, and reindexing machines we reduce both of them to (1, s 2 /s 1 ). Hence, the algorithm is supposed to produce the same solution. We thus consider the following class of algorithms:
Definition 19 (symmetric algorithm) An algorithm A is symmetric if, for any two speed vectors s and s ′ such that, for a permutation π, s ′ = π(s) it holds that, for all i, w
A simple argument shows that any monotone algorithm which is best-first and symmetric cannot be less than 2-competitive, even for m = 2. There are, however, algorithms which are best-first though not symmetric or vice versa. Does any of these give a better performance? The next two results prove that the answer to this question is no.
Theorem 20 For every m ≥ 2, no online monotone best-first algorithm for Q m ||C max can be better than 2-competitive. This holds even for two jobs.
PROOF. By contradiction, let A be a best-first, monotone and (2 − γ)-competitive algorithm, for some γ > 0. Consider J = (1, 1 + ε), for some ε > 0, and let s 1 = 1, s 2 = 1 + ε and s i = ε, with 3 ≤ i ≤ m. Notice that, since A is (2 − γ)-competitive and best-first, it is possible to take ε sufficiently small so that A assigns the first job to machine 2 and the second job to machine 1.
Suppose now that speed of machine 2 is reduced to 1 − ε. We observe that A, on input J and (1, 1 − ε) assigns no jobs to machine 2. In fact, since it is best-first, it assigns the first job to machine 1. Moreover, since it is monotone, it has to assign a load to machine 2 not greater than 1. Thus, also the second job is assigned to machine 1. However, this implies that the solution computed by A has cost 2 + ε, while the optimum has cost 1 + ε. For ε sufficiently small, this contradicts the hypothesis that A is (2 − γ)-competitive.
Theorem 21
For every m ≥ 2, no online monotone symmetric algorithm for Q 2 ||C max can be less than 2-competitive. This holds even for two jobs.
PROOF. We prove the theorem for m = 2. The extension to m > 2 is straighforward. Let us assume by contraddiciton that A is a monotone, symmetric, and (2 − γ)-competitive algorithm, for some 0 < γ < 1. Consider J = (1, 1 + ε), for some ε > 0 and let s 1 = 1 and s 2 = 1 + ε. For sufficiently small ε, algorithm A cannot allocate two jobs on the same machine. We thus have two possible solutions for algorithm A:
solution machine 1 machine 2
. We distinguish two cases: (A((1, 1 + ε) , J) = SOL 1 .) By monotonicity of A, w ((1, 1) , J) = 0, then we have a solution of cost 2 + ε, thus implying that A must be at least (2 + ε)/(1 + ε)-competitive. For our choice of ε, this would contradict the hypothesis that A is (2 − γ)-competitive. Thus, A((1, 1), J) must coincide with solution SOL 1 . Again, by monotonicity, it must hold w ((1 + ε, 1) , J) = J 1 + J 2 = 2 + ε, then A cannot be (2 − γ)-competitive because of our choice of ε. Therefore, it must be the case that w 
Remark 22
Observe that our monotonization technique for offline algorithms requires the algorithm to be "monotonized" to be both best-first and symmetric. Thus, we implicity require the resulting algorithm to be best-first and symmetric as well.
Online Mechanisms with Verification
In this section we consider online mechanisms with verification [ADPP04b] : the payments to an agent can be provided after the corresponding machine terminates; in this case, the mechanism can compute the payments as a function of such finish time(s). In the online setting, once machine j releases a job J i , the mechanism observes a release time r(J i ). However, machine j could declare to be slower (i.e., b j > s j ) and release all jobs accordingly (i.e., r(J i ) = J i /b j ).
In [ADPP04b] we provide a sufficient condition to design truthful mechanisms:
Definition 23 (weakly monotone algorithm [ADPP04b] ) An algorithm A is weakly monotone if, for every job sequence J, for every i, for every s −i it holds that
We will make use of the following result: Algorithm Monotone-Assign-R(s, Λ): /* s 1 ≤ s 2 · · · ≤ s m ; */ initialize w ′ j := 0 and w ′′ j := 0 for every machine j; 1. upon arrival of new job J i do begin 2. let l be the slowest machine such that We first observe that the greedy algorithm is weakly monotone. Therefore, we have the following result on the "power" of verification for the Q 2 ||C max problem: 
PROOF. Consider r such that √ 2 < r ≤ φ, thus implying r < 1+1/r. Theorem 16 implies that no online monotone algorithm can be less than LB(r)-competitive, with LB(r) = min{r, 1 + 1/r} = r. On the contrary, if verification is allowed, then the greedy algorithm is weakly monotone. Theorem 24 thus implies that its competitive ratio ρ gr satisfies (see Table 1 )
For r > √ 2, it holds that r > 1 + 1/(r + 1), thus implying U B v (r) < LB(r). 2
In [AAF + 97] an 8-competitive algorithm Assign-R has been given. The algorithm assumes that the optimum opt(s, J) is known in advance and assigns a new job to the least capable machine, that is, the slowest machine such that the cost of the resulting assignment stays below Λ def = 2 · opt(s, J). A simple doubling technique is then used to remove this assumption at the cost of losing a factor of 4 in the approximation.
A simple observation shows that algorithm Assign-R is not weakly monotone. We next modify it so to obtain a weakly-monotone algorithm having a constant competitive ratio for the Q||C max problem, i.e., for any (even non-constant) number of machines.
Algorithm Monotone-Assign-R (see Fig. 4 ) receives a threshold Λ. In assigning the k th job to a machine, the algorithm considers the slowest machine i for which the makespan of the resulting schedule, computed considering only the real jobs, does not exceed 2Λ. Then two cases are possible:
1. At least one machine faster than j has not received any load yet. Then job k is assigned to the fastest such machine and is considered a ghost job.
2. All machines faster than j have been assigned at least one job. In this case, job k is assigned to machine j and is considered a real job.
Lemma 26
For every speed vector s and for every Λ ≥ 2 · opt(s, J), algorithm MonotoneAssign-R does not fail in assigning any newly arrived job in J. Moreover, if algorithm MonotoneAssign-R fails in assigning a job J i , then opt(s, J) ≥ opt(s, J i ) ≥ Λ.
PROOF. Let J ′ denote the set of jobs that Monotone-Assign-R assigns to a machine which is currently empty, and J ′′ def = J \ J ′ . Jobs in J ′′ are assigned according to algorithm Assign-R. Hence, if Monotone-Assign-R fails, then Assign-R fails as well. Therefore, opt(s, J i ) ≥ Λ and the lemma follows.
Using a doubling technique (see e.g. [Aza98] ) one can obtain an algorithm Monotone-Assign-R which, starting from Λ = 1, doubles the value of Λ each time Monotone-Assign-R(s, Λ) fails: in this case we assign J i , and jobs that possibly arise subsequently, by running Monotone-Assign-R with a new parameter Λ ′ = 2Λ. (We continue doubling the value of Λ until it is possible to assign J i to some machine.) Notice that every time we double the value of Λ, we ignore the assignment performed in the previous phases (i.e., for smaller values of Λ).
Theorem 27
Algorithm Monotone-Assign-R is at most 12-competitive.
PROOF. Let J
′ denote the set of jobs that Monotone-Assign-R assigns to a machine which is currently empty, and J We denote by Λ(s, i) the value of Λ for which Monotone-Assign-R allocates job J i . We will prove by induction on i that Λ(s, i) = Λ(s ′ , i) and that Monotone-Assign-R produces the same allocation. The base step i = 1 is trivial. As for the inductive step, since J i is not allocated to machine with speed s i , let l be the index of the machine to which J i is allocated to. If (w ′′ l + J i )/s l ≤ Λ(s, i − 1), then, by inductive hypothesis, the same holds with respect to s ′ , thus implying that J i is also allocated to machine l on input s ′ . Clearly, in this case, Λ(s ′ , i) = Λ(s ′ , i − 1) = Λ(s, i). Otherwise, let l(s) and l(s ′ ) denote the index of the machine to which job J i is assigned to on input s and s ′ , respectively. In the two cases, we must increase the corresponding threshold up to a value such that (w Step 2 in Monotone-Assign-R(s, Λ)). By inductive hypothesis, the allocation of J i−1 is the same, thus implying that also job J i is allocated to the same machine.
Finally, using the payment functions for weakly monotone algorithms of [ADPP04b] , we can obtain the following:
Corollary 29 The Q||C max problem with verifiable machines admits an online truthful polynomialtime mechanism which is 12-competitive.
